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Introduction 
Technological Growth 
The advancements made in technology in recent years have prompted 
unprecedented interaction between customers and digital products, especially within the 
realms of e-commerce and the Internet.  Online shopping has become a trillion dollar 
world economy, and while it still only represents single digit percentages of the retail 
market, its rate of growth far exceeds that of in-store shopping (Jordan, “The tipping 
point”).  Even though the United States represents roughly a fifth of the world’s e-
commerce on its own, a huge boom in mobile phone shopping has occurred in the 
populous and rapidly developing Asian-Pacific countries.  Thanks to smartphones, 
many people now have convenient and “on-the-go” access to massive digital stores like 
Amazon and eBay for their shopping needs, especially if people are located in more 
isolated or rural areas.  These stores are accessed through what are commonly referred 
to as “apps,” or software that is designed to improve consumer’s interaction with the 
store and products.  Digital programs like these help dictate nearly every action an 
average citizen participates in while accessing the Internet, from web browsers that 
navigate the world wide web to company-specific apps that make using their product 
easier. 
 
Moreover, mobile financial applications have become a huge part of developing 
countries, allowing isolated people and communities access to Internet stores, online 
banking, and even a local form of currency.  Kenya and Uganda, for example, have 
become part of the vanguard of mobile financial services, simply through necessity of 
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progression.  With our current technological status, cell phone coverage is not a 
prohibitively expensive operation, even in poorer nations.  In fact, even in rural African 
countries, 30% of households own cell phones (Voigt).  This connectivity has enabled 
online interaction like never before, growing local economy by significant margins, 
simply by allowing businesses to set up shop and use e-currency for their goods or 
giving farmers the opportunity to check where they can find the best prices for their 
livestock. 
 
Data Transfer and Security 
Almost everyone knows that they need Internet access in order to connect with 
the products they want, play their games, or browse the web, but what is the actual 
behind-the-scenes process that allows them to do so?  The short and woefully 
incomplete answer is that our network-connecting devices follow a series of rules, the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), that tell them how and when 
to transmit and receive packets of data.  Since there is rarely a direct line from one 
computer to another, the data is sent over the Internet from one terminal to another, 
which includes personal computers, each of which then forward it onto the next 
destination until it finally reaches its goal.  This data comprises all the visible aspects of 
interacting with the Internet, such a web page, and a lot of hidden information, such a 
computer’s digital fingerprint or the encryption of the data.  The security of the data 
being transferred is oftentimes overlooked because while we can physically prevent 
other people from seeing our screens, we rely on our device’s software to protect our 
information. 
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One of the most common, current methods for keeping data private and secure is 
o use TSL/SSL (Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer), so called for the 
layering of data with encryption and the connected servers acting as two ends of a 
transfer.  This is a system that makes use of cryptography to provide a secure and 
verified connection between two computers, so that the data being transferred cannot be 
read and abused by an outside source.  The host server, i.e., the computer being 
accessed by the consumer, has purchased an SSL certificate from a web services 
company that essentially confirms that the purchaser is who they say they are through 
research and reference checking.  Once confirmed, the certificate is awarded, thus 
allowing a company to verify their online identity, use a hosting server, and uniquely 
encrypt any data going into or leaving their online service.  This all comes into play 
when consumers attempt to connect to the service through their own network 
devices.  Initially, the consumer’s device makes a connection to the website, but before 
transferring any data they verify the service with the SSL certificate.  If that checks out, 
a connection, or “handshake,” is formed between the two computers, and data flows 
back and forth, scrambled on departure and descrambled on arrival according to the 
certificate’s encryption.  This sort of security is widely used in web browsing, e-mail, 
messaging, and e-commerce, among others, because they are all areas that have the 
potential to reveal a great deal of personal and important information. 
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Man In The Middle Attacks 
Despite all the money, effort, and research that has gone into improving the 
security of our Internet connections, virtual identity theft, hacked accounts, and stolen 
financial information are not uncommon news stories.  In addition, online privacy rights 
have been a large issue in developed countries since the Internet’s inception and 
widespread popularization.  Edward Snowden achieved infamy recently for his release 
of government documents detailing some questionable investigative activities the 
United States government has performed on its citizens.  In interviews he still advocates 
that people avoid using potentially insecure products like Dropbox, Facebook, Google, 
and unencrypted text messages (Snowden).  The underlying similarity between products 
like these is the concern for the security of transferred information.  For example, 
Snowden cites Dropbox because it only encrypts data during transfer, rather than while 
it is still on the machine, allowing a vulnerability in the case that some error occurs 
during the transfer or prior to the encryption, allowing an opportunity for a Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) attack to occur. 
 
A MITM attack is when a third party is able to gain access to the connection 
between two parties by intercepting the data being transferred.  Recalling the TCP/IP 
process mentioned earlier, data must travel through multiple machines until it reaches 
its destination, which means that if anyone manages to insert themselves in the data’s 
path, the hijacker has a chance at eavesdropping on the digital conversation.  The best 
opportunity for a person to hack the connection is by knowing the location of the sender 
or the receiver.  For this reason, most MITM attacks occur on unsecured WiFi 
connections, but hackers can also wait outside popular server addresses like those of 
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online banks.  Here, there is a brief window in which the person can employ a variety of 
methods to gain the sender’s trust, which include stealing the server’s identification key, 
mimicking the server’s certificate authority, or taking advantage of the sender’s lack of 
validation process.  If any of these work, an exchange of public encryption keys occurs 
such that the middleman can read the data sent by either side, as well as send data to 
one party under the guise of the other.  A simplified visual representation of a common 
financial MITM attack is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 1:  MITM attack. veracode.com 
 
MITM attacks are one of the greatest threats to personal information because if 
someone can get a hold of the digital key that unlocks the SSL encryption scheme, that 
person has free reign with the transferred data to decrypt it, read it, modify it, re-encrypt 
it with the other computer’s key, and forward it.  Although these attacks are often used 
by those with malicious motives, sometimes they are done to spy on and watch over 
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others.  Following Snowden’s release on NSA surveillance and news coverage of strict 
government control over the Internet in other countries like China and North Korea, 
people are becoming more wary of George Orwell’s 1984 Big Brother scenario turning 
from fiction to reality.  However, those most at risk are the ones who use everyday 
mobile applications, often related to online shopping, as these programs are used the 
most often and have been found to have many susceptibilities.  Studies have shown that 
many developers build broken code on purpose, or that after being notified of a 
vulnerability in their code they will choose not to fix it, or if they do then it often takes 
over a year (Bates et. al.).  The report does not indicate why that is (a route for further 
research), but one possibility is simply a desire to save time, money, and energy by 
cutting corners, especially if the application works most of the time and is consequently 
easier to use.  Considering our world’s ever-growing e-market and pursuit of 
convenience through mobile devices, continued research in this field becomes 
proportionally more relevant and important in its efforts to sustain optimum security 
through the detection and prevention of vulnerabilities. 
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Research/Methods 
Current Research 
The current research was motivated by the report “Detecting and Patching 
Vulnerable SSL Source Code with ROSE” by Adam Bates, Braden Hollembaek, and 
Dave Tian of the University of Oregon.  The report focuses on the inability of clients to 
accurately authenticate the server when presented with its public key certificate.  
Essentially, how do we as consumers know that the online service we are connecting to 
is legitimate?  To give a real life example, imagine going through the checkout line at 
the supermarket and paying for your items with a credit card.  There are a few under-
the-surface assumptions being made that we tend not to think about during these 
interactions.  One is that our money is being extracted in the correct amount from our 
bank account and that it is actually going to the store, rather than the cashier’s own 
account.  Another is that our card’s information is not somehow being saved locally and 
abused at a later date.  These are difficult for us to control or ensure, so we have to trust 
the system.  Another assumption from the store’s end is that the person paying for the 
items is also the owner of the card.  The cashier can ask, “Can I see some 
identification?” to validate that customer is the card’s owner, but that certainly doesn’t 
happen every time, which leaves an opportunity for a real-life MITM attack to use your 
information without your consent.  Additionally, if the store doesn’t teach their 
employees how to verify a card’s owner, then it becomes impossible for the consumer 
to hope that in future interactions where the credit card is used, the owner will be 
validated. 
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The ultimate problem is that SSL certificate validation is broken in many critical 
software applications and libraries, primarily due to terrible design of the application 
programming interfaces, or APIs, to underlying SSL libraries.  APIs are collections of 
code that provide similar services but allow a developer to implement those services 
according to their needs.  An everyday example would be a deck of cards.  Their 
general purpose is to be played with, but the execution is up to the user.  A person can 
play any number of card games, either on their own or with others, with only their own 
rules to govern their actions.  Once you own the cards, they simply provide a platform 
for your implementation.  An example of an API on the Internet could be Facebook.  If 
you have ever seen those Facebook buttons on websites asking you to like them or 
check out their page, that is a Facebook API.  It is not Facebook itself, but rather a tool 
whose primary purpose is to link to Facebook, and which allows the website to 
customize its click destination, placement on the page, and so on.  To understand the 
API problem as it relates to SSL, imagine that the Facebook button did not employ SSL 
checking properly, so when you were redirected and asked to sign into your account, 
someone else managed to steal your login information.  Certificate validation in the 
initial handshake is critical to the success of a secure connection, so when code is 
created that ignores, breaks, or does not fully address this issue, man-in-the-middle 
attacks are much more likely to succeed.  The research that’s already been done on this 
issue has noticed that most of the fault lies with the developers themselves because the 
SSL libraries being used are mainly correct.  Programmers simply don’t use the 
provided code correctly, or they misunderstand the numerous options, parameters, and 
return values given by the library’s working code.  Thus, this research does not seek to 
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improve existing libraries and SSL code, but rather identify when written code is failing 
to achieve the desired security result. 
 
SSLChecker and ROSE 
This research focuses on building an automatic and scalable program called 
SSLChecker for going through the original, or “source,” code of vulnerable SSL 
applications and making sure those validation checks are in place.  This program makes 
use of ROSE, an open source compiler infrastructure developed at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (Quinlan et. al.).  Like a compiler, its job is to take in 
source code and convert it into different source or machine code so that the computer 
can read and understand the operations it is being asked to perform.  In everyday life, 
this process could be compared to that of a grammar checker in a text editor.  The editor 
does not actually understand what the sentence is saying or the context it is being 
written in.  All it knows is that there are certain structural rules that clauses and 
sentences must follow in order to be considered valid, such as the necessary presence of 
a subject and a verb, or that two commas in a row does not make sense.  The sentence is 
broken down to its component parts of speech and its punctuation, and from there a set 
of rules is consulted to make sure that they are all abiding by the grammatical laws of 
the language.  So, after the compiler finishes the translation from source to machine 
code, it creates a new type of file called an object file that can be run and execute the 
actions dictated by the source code. 
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ROSE provides source code parsing for various programming languages, as well 
as a variety of program analysis and transformation tools.  This is because as the code is 
being compiled and the component parts are being identified, ROSE builds a tree data 
structure, setting each part as its own “node” with a ROSE equivalent explanation of 
what the node’s function is.  In effect, ROSE is making the code transformation 
processes available to the programmer in more a more readable and analyzable fashion, 
specifically through the creation of a traversable abstract syntax tree, or AST.  An AST 
is an inverted tree-looking representation of source code’s syntactic structure detailing 
the component parts, their locations in the code, and their relationships to one 
another.  Because ROSE has its own nomenclature for these parts, ROSE can 
implement a unique traversal method to visit every node and get its information, 
through a variation on the Visitor Pattern.  Depending upon the programmer’s 
preference, ROSE can then display the information, change the node, or simply move to 
the next node.  Below is a small example of an abstract syntax tree with its associated 
code, though the reader should keep in mind the number of nodes present for only five 
lines of simple code, as well the fact that ROSE’s complex infrastructure would add 
many additional layers for the same code: 
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Figure 2:  A Syntax Tree representation example for a small program. 
 
Using ROSE to step through every piece of the source code, automatic 
modifications can be made to the source code if SSLChecker finds an absence of a 
critical verification method or mistake in the verification process.  So, if the user fails to 
make the host server identify itself, that code will be added directly into the 
application.  This result is designed to create an “idiot-proof” method for fixing, 
alerting, and optimizing code automatically, simply telling the developer what was 
wrong and how it was fixed, hopefully providing an incentive and means for easier code 
improvement.  Although a prototype SSLChecker has already been built, the “Detecting 
and Patching Vulnerable SSL Source Code with ROSE” report details a great many 
ways that the software could be improved upon moving forward, and as of now this is 
something the research will focus on.  Some examples include adding checks for non-
existent but necessary methods for verification, analyzing the returned statuses of the 
validation functions, detecting which library is being used to build the application 
software so that only the appropriate checks are being run, and running the checker on 
unfamiliar software.  
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Process 
Language and Library 
The process began by identifying which programming language the team wanted 
to analyze with SSLChecker and ROSE, as they both have the capacity of working with 
C, C++, Java, Python, and PHP.  The plan at the beginning of the project was to work 
with Java in order to make use of the Eclipse IDE as both a helpful programming tool 
and hopefully allowing us to incorporate any changes made into Eclipse’s automated 
code checking itself.  However, it was later decided that C would be the best language 
to begin in because it is the most stable environment for both SSLChecker and ROSE, 
as well as the fact that libcurl’s SSL source code base could be analyzed.  The libcurl 
library is a collection of URL transfer protocols written in C (hence the lib-c-url name) 
that purports to allow a programmer to establish secure online connections, including 
HTTPS and SSL certificates (Stenberg et. al.).  Many large and well-known companies 
like Apple, Adobe, and Google use libcurl for their online platforms, so it is important 
that the library and its security-based connections are as safe as possible to prevent 
MITM attacks.  A potential end goal for this project is to be able to run SSLChecker on 
a large source code library like libcurl, hone in on the uses of SSL certificate 
verification, and then find cases where either the correct SSL verification functions are 
absent, or where critical variables are set incorrectly.  
 
Insecure_ok 
Because ROSE is a complicated environment where many lines of code are 
needed to sift through ROSE’s tree structure correctly, we decided to start by finding 
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one instance of a variable that was created, or “declared”, unsafely and then writing 
code to find it.  Thus, we searched through libcurl’s library and found a Boolean (true or 
false) variable insecure_ok that matched our requirements for faulty variables.  Figure 1 
below shows all the instances of insecure_ok in the libcurl library, and what is 
interesting to note is that when the variable was declared, it was not assigned a constant 
value of any sort, meaning that it was potentially uninitialized.   
 
 
Figure 3: The accumulated instances of insecure_ok.  Personal screenshot. 
 
An analogy for an uninitialized variable in the English language could be 
explained via the sentence, “Bob went to the store and it was good.”  Whatever 
problems the sentence might have, let us focus on the use of the word it.  When we say 
it was good, what does that mean?  Was it the trip to the store, the store, the shopping 
experience, Bob himself, or something else entirely?  In this instance, it represents our 
uninitialized variable and creates an issue because it was not explicit 
enough.  Uninitialized variables are often a cause of bugs in programs because the 
language can set that variable to any value.  Some programming languages like Java 
and Python have built in checks, such as not allowing the use of such variables, but C 
was designed for systems programming in which developers were aware of the dangers 
uninitialized variables posed to performance.  In C, variables are allocated stack space, 
and a collection of these spaces make up a stack frame.  An uninitialized variable can 
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then be assigned the value of where the stack pointer is located, which is typically a 
virtual address within the computer.  Thus, the problem is that insecure_ok has an 
arbitrary value when it is initialized, and if it is used before it is given a constant 
true/false value, like when tool_operate.C checks its value in Figure 1, an error 
can occur if the value is not a constant.  Alternatively, a hacker might manage to force 
the system to give a certain value to the uninitialized variable, that would set 
insecure_ok to true, allow for insecure SSL connections to go through, and open the 
connection to a MITM attack. 
 
Like the paper mentioned before, this research builds off of the previously 
constructed SSLChecker code to create additional checks for problems like the one 
mentioned above.  The file sslc_c.C was part of that suite and checked C code using 
ROSE, so the team modified the visitorTraversal function of the program, which 
visits and identifies every component node, to run additional checks for this variable 
and others like it.  In ROSE, this involves identifying all variable declarations that exist 
within the source code, then consecutively ensuring that an initializer and assignment 
initializer both exist.  If the initializer exists, then we know that there is an equals sign 
indicating that the variable is being initialized to some value.  If the assignment 
initializer is not empty or set to a NULL value, then we know that some value is being 
assigned by the developer to the variable.  At this point, the right-hand-side operand can 
be checked for its type, such as an integer, Boolean, text string, or some other 
constant.  If it is a static and unchanging constant, then we know the variable is properly 
initialized.  This does not necessarily ensure that the constant being assigned is correct, 
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but that is beyond the scope of this research.  However, if it turns out that one variable 
is being assigned the value of another variable, then the cycle of safety checking begins 
anew with the new variable.  It could be the case that when it is declared elsewhere in 
the library, perhaps even in another file or directory, it is uninitialized, given a bad 
value, or assigned to yet another variable.  Hence, we conservatively check for 
assignment with a constant on the right-hand-side. 
 
In addition, a check for global variables is included in order to provide greater 
analysis and understanding of the variable.  Global variables are declared outside of any 
functions and can be used anywhere in the code. When a global variable’s value is set 
or changed in one location, every instance of the variable is updated with the new 
value.  This is distinguished from local variables which may be declared and used in a 
single function.  While global variables can provide some usefulness in simplifying 
code by making it easily accessible to all the functions and classes in a program, it is 
common practice to avoid them for their potentially dangerous consequences.  The 
nonlocality of globals makes testing them, constraining their program-wide influence, 
preventing simultaneous usage, and optimizing memory allocation difficult, and when 
these factors are not controlled, errors and bugs become more likely.   
 
Specifically for this research, assigning the value of a global variable to another 
variable may make tracking the value to its source more straightforward, but it also 
leaves room for other variables of the same name as the global to change the value to an 
unallowed type or constant.  The variable insecure_ok is a global variable, though as 
can be seen from Figure 1, the uses are limited and easily tracked.  Searching for the 
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declaration of toggle, the value given to insecure_ok after its declaration, in the libcurl 
library, its only usage is inside the tool_getparam.c file, and it is even initialized 
to TRUE.  Upon closer examination, however, toggle can be switched from FALSE 
depending upon the input parameters.  Thus, a user decides whether to allow for 
Boolean values to be used in their program by inputting their own argument at launch-
time.  Though this by itself does not cause an issue in the program, leaving an 
opportunity available for such uncontrolled and unrestricted input could be a source for 
error in the future. 
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Results and the Future 
Though the newly added checks to the SSLChecker suite might not sound 
extensive, the importance of this first step should not be underestimated.  The fact is 
that those simple but hard-fought for steps act as a proof of concept for greater changes 
to be made and improved upon within the pre-established suite.  There already exists a 
problem in software development where programmers ignore warnings or suppress 
them entirely for the sake of creating and using workable code.  However, the fact that 
they exist at all to be examined and fixed is the key to optimizing code, and so this 
research attempts to improve upon SSLChecker’s functionality by adding those types of 
warnings when faulty code is found.  Simply by warning any programmer that uses this 
software on a large SSL source code library that potentially dangerous uninitialized 
variables exist, or that critical functions for ensuring the security of data via the SSL 
process are missing or set incorrectly, previously unknown problems emerge for 
analysis and correction.   
 
With software, it is important to understand that even small changes can have an 
enormous impact.  If using the wrong type of variable can cost the European Space 
Agency $7.5 billion with the explosion of the Ariane 5 rocket, then it is not a stretch to 
say that any size of fix to SSL source code libraries could save people and their banks 
an enormous amount of time, stress, and money over the years.  With identity fraud 
occurring once every two seconds, resulting in billions of dollars stolen each year, 
providing increased security and safer SSL libraries should be a priority.  Especially as 
continuously more people enter into the digital methods of banking, shopping, and 
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transferring money, it should be our duty as programmers to ensure that such widely 
used services provide the best possible experience for their users, including 
ourselves.  That is why it is imperative that this research continues so that the checks 
established now can be expanded upon to work with different programming languages 
and SSL libraries.  Additionally, these checks should be incorporated into the 
programming integrated development environments, or IDEs (where code is written), so 
that rather than run the third party SSLChecker on a library, the checks can be done 
automatically as the code is being written for the convenience of the developer.  This 
way, the problems are addressed at the source, rather than after the software has been 
completed and distributed. 
 
The digital revolution has brought about miraculous advancements to our world 
in such a short amount of time, and the evolution of technology still increases 
exponentially.  Meanwhile, these same changes have also brought with them their fair 
share of problems, demonstrating that the results of this progress are merely tools that 
can be used for either good or bad.  The Internet has undoubtedly changed the world, 
though being as imperfect as it is, much of its effect on society and people has been 
negative.  Keeping this in mind, however, and understanding the role SSL connections 
play in netizen (net citizen) interactions with the web, are some of the most impactful 
ways that we can help alleviate these burdens for ourselves and all the netizens to come.
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